Context: Israel has carried out hundreds of airstrikes against Iranian and Iran-linked targets in Syria for years, motivated by concerns that Iran-backed forces could set up near the armistice line on the Golan Heights, and that Iran has been transferring high-precision weapons to its local allies, including Hezbollah.

What's happening: In an operation in Aqraba, Syria, last week, Israel destroyed what it called "killer drones" that it said Iran was going to use to attack.

• In Iraq — which is already caught between competing U.S. and Iranian interests — Israel is suspected of having conducted attacks targeting munitions storage facilities used by Iraqi paramilitary groups, including one last month.
• Then on Aug. 25, the Lebanese army claimed that an Israeli drone "crashed and [a] second drone exploded in the air" in Beirut. The next day, another suspected Israeli drone hit an Iran-backed militia in the Bekaa Valley.
• In a speech on Sunday, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah warned that a response to the incidents in Lebanon "may take place at any time on the borders and beyond the borders."
• On Monday, Iraq's political leadership met with senior militia commanders and, without naming names, denounced "blatant, hostile acts." An electoral bloc drawn from the paramilitary forces went further, calling the incidents "a declaration of war" carried out by Israel that the U.S. is "fully responsible" for as well.
• Israel has only officially acknowledged one set of operations in recent days: the "large-scale attack of multiple killer drones" via airstrikes in Syria.

Between the lines: Previous escalations between Iran and Israel in Syria have been contained. Israeli strikes have rarely elicited significant responses, and if they did, Israel retaliated with major military actions — like Operation House of Cards in May 2018, which swiftly ended that particular episode of escalation.

The bottom line: The current escalation is drawing in a far wider range of actors and is hitting closer to Iran’s core interests, making it that much more difficult to prevent, contain or control.

Robert Malley is president & CEO of the International Crisis Group. Naysan Rafati is Crisis Group's Iran analyst.

How it works: The deal would create a joint U.S.-Turkey military operations center in southern Turkey to potentially establish a buffer zone up to 18 miles into northern Syria, which could also facilitate the return of Syrian refugees.

The catch: The Syrian Democratic Forces sees Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian rebels as existential threats and in the past year has made overtures to Russia and the Syrian government.

• Without a clear and sustained deconfliction mechanism, Turkish incursions to preserve its own security interests could spark further clashes between two U.S. partners, opening a new front in the war.

Background: Turkey has long expressed national security concerns over the predominance of Kurdish elements in the SDF, which were trained by the U.S. to counter the Islamic State.

• These troops are aligned with the Kurdistan Workers' Party insurgency that Turkey and its allies — including the U.S. — consider a terrorist group.
• They aspire to create a Kurdish state, which would be unacceptable to Turkey as well as the parties to the Syrian conflict.

Between the lines: The population of more than 3.6 million Syria refugees hosted in Turkey — once embraced as "guests" by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party — have been tossed under the bus as the party's popular support has eroded.

• Human rights groups have alleged forced deportations from Istanbul and reported on plans to relocate nearly 700,000 refugees into Turkish-controlled areas in Syria's north.
• Those moves would form a demographic buffer between Turkey and Syrian Kurds, while appealing to widespread anti-refugee and anti-Kurdish sentiment.

What to watch: Without restraint by Turkey and long-term military assurances by the U.S., the SDF could be pushed to join the Russia-Syria-Iran axis or to seek reintegration with Syria, perhaps with a degree of Kurdish autonomy.

• While Turkey’s brinkmanship may have paid off in securing U.S. support to smooth over tensions, northern Syria will continue to challenge a more circumscribed U.S. Middle East policy.

Adham Sahloul is a foreign policy analyst and former researcher at the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.