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Weeks before his planned summit with Kim Jong-un, President Trump reportedly pushed the Pentagon to consider reducing troop numbers in South Korea, reflecting his long-held conviction that the U.S. shouldn't subsidize other countries’ defense needs. 

Why it matters: While Trump clarified that a drawdown was for future, not immediate, consideration, these reports could influence Kim's pre-summit calculations: If Trump seems eager at the outset to achieve peace and declare success by promising withdrawal, Kim might feel less pressure to sacrifice his primary leverage — his nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. 

Trump's push follows his call for a withdrawal from Syria, in keeping with his apparent belief that strategic progress should yield peace dividends (namely troop returns and reduced overseas expenditures). But he appears particularly skeptical of the value of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, given both the South's developed economy and the North's continued pursuit of nuclear and long-range weapons despite the permanent  presence of some 30,000 U.S. troops. 

Aside from summit considerations, any troop drawdown would also incur a long-term strategic cost, hardening impressions that the U.S. is ceding its traditional leadership role. If confidence in U.S. power recedes, many Asian countries will confront a choice between deferring more to Beijing or developing military capabilities — including nuclear weapons — to protect against Chinese coercion. If Japan begins to doubt America’s security umbrella and goes nuclear, others will likely follow. 

The big picture: For the past 70 years, America's presence in Asia has provided a check against countries tempted to use force to move borders, seize resources or redress historical grievances. U.S. abdication of its leadership role in a region riven by deep-rooted animosities could elevate the risk of catastrophic conflict.   

Ryan Hass is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings.

The high-stakes gamble of reducing troops on the Korean Peninsula

U.S. abdication from East Asia could elevate the risk of nuclear conflict.

North Korean soldiers look at the South Korean side on the border between North and South Korea on October 27, 2017. 

North Korean soldiers look at the South side of the border between North and South Korea on October 27, 2017. Photo: Jung Yeon-Je/AFP via Getty Images

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Weeks before his planned summit with Kim Jong-un, President Trump reportedly <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="pushed" data-vars-click-url="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/world/asia/trump-troops-south-korea.html?hp&amp;action=click&amp;pgtype=Homepage&amp;clickSource=story-heading&amp;module=first-column-region&amp;region=top-news&amp;WT.nav=top-news" data-vars-content-id="1f156689-bd26-4222-b847-434c6e447a40" data-vars-headline="The high-stakes gamble of reducing troops on the Korean Peninsula" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/world/asia/trump-troops-south-korea.html?hp&amp;action=click&amp;pgtype=Homepage&amp;clickSource=story-heading&amp;module=first-column-region&amp;region=top-news&amp;WT.nav=top-news" target="_blank">pushed</a> the Pentagon to consider reducing troop numbers in South Korea, reflecting his long-held conviction that the U.S. shouldn&#x27;t subsidize other countries’ defense needs. Why it matters: While Trump <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="clarified" data-vars-click-url="http://thehill.com/policy/defense/386217-trump-troop-withdrawal-from-south-korea-not-on-the-table" data-vars-content-id="1f156689-bd26-4222-b847-434c6e447a40" data-vars-headline="The high-stakes gamble of reducing troops on the Korean Peninsula" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="http://thehill.com/policy/defense/386217-trump-troop-withdrawal-from-south-korea-not-on-the-table" target="_blank">clarified</a> that a drawdown was for future, not immediate, consideration, these reports could influence Kim&#x27;s pre-summit calculations: If Trump seems eager at the outset to achieve peace and declare success by promising withdrawal, Kim might feel less pressure to sacrifice his primary leverage — his nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

China is becoming the most formidable rival America has faced, and the risk of confrontation with Russia, North Korea or Iran still looms. Authoritarians are rising, the chaotic Afghanistan exit revealed the limits of U.S. power, and the pandemic, climate change and other critical challenges continue to pose grave threats.

The resignation of Joseph Yun, the State Department’s Special Representative for North Korea policy, this week serves as a fresh reminder of the gaping hole at the center of America’s North Korea strategy: the absence of a credible diplomatic approach to talking — and eventually negotiating — with North Korea.

Why it matters: There are no guarantees that entering into dialogue with North Korea would yield progress. In fact, the past record gives little cause for optimism. Even so, there are other reasons for the United States to seize diplomatic initiative.

Visible, direct diplomatic outreach would clarify North Korea’s understanding of U.S. bottom lines, reduce the likelihood of miscalculation, improve U.S. capacity to manage escalation should an incident occur, and satisfy allies’ and partners’ desire to see the the U.S. make a meaningful effort to manage tensions. It also would strengthen international support for tightening sanctions. At a broader level, active diplomacy reinforces U.S. leadership in Asia, a superior alternative to ceding the diplomatic field to China. 

Yes, but: Diplomatic outreach would not require any lessening of the maximum pressure campaign against North Korea, which should be sustained and strengthened. Diplomacy complements these efforts by putting in stark relief for Kim Jong-un the choice he faces between clinging to a weapons program that risks his survival and enabling a better life for his people.

Ryan Hass is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings.

Trump's North Korea strategy faces growing diplomatic deficits

The resignation of the State Department's Special Representative for North Korea is the latest setback.

Joseph Yun (L) with South Korean and Japanese diplomatic counterparts. Photo: Toru Yamanaka / AFP / Pool / Anadolu Agency / Getty Images

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The resignation of Joseph Yun, the State Department’s Special Representative for North Korea policy, this week serves as a fresh reminder of the gaping hole at the center of America’s North Korea strategy: the absence of a credible diplomatic approach to talking — and eventually negotiating — with North Korea.Why it matters: There are no guarantees that entering into dialogue with North Korea would yield progress. In fact, the past record gives little cause for optimism. Even so, there are other reasons for the United States to seize diplomatic initiative.

Even as fears of open conflict have increased in recent months, the Trump administration has in fact made strides in its strategy against North Korea.

The North Korean economy is contracting, trade volume with China is plummeting and economic ties with other key trading partners are being systematically dismantled. Kim Jong-un no longer boasts that his people will not need to “tighten their belts,” as he  pledged upon assuming power. North Korean news services complain that sanctions are hurting and anecdotal reports also suggest growing disillusionment with Kim’s economic stewardship.

As sanctions shrink the sources of national revenue, Kim will have to choose between funding his nuclear and missile programs, paying his military and security services, or buying off the country's elite. When this becomes the case, Kim’s survival instincts will likely compel him to prioritize the loyalty of North Korea’s elite and its security services, which in turn will slow nuclear and missile advances and create space for diplomacy. 

The bottom line: The pressure campaign is making headway and deserves more time to work. Enforcement of U.S. and international sanctions can still be enhanced on North Korea and its enablers, and countries should continue to be urged to sever economic ties with Pyongyang. The more the international community is united and the Kim regime is under internal stress, the higher the likelihood of a peaceful diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff.

Signs of progress in Trump's North Korea pressure campaign

Economic contraction and a disillusioned populace are taking a toll.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un presiding over a target strike exercise conducted by the special operation forces of the Korean People's Army (KPA) at an undisclosed location. Photo: AFP / KCNA via KNS / Getty Images

Even as fears of open conflict have increased in recent months, the Trump administration has in fact made strides in its strategy against North Korea.The North Korean economy is contracting, trade volume with China is plummeting and economic ties with other key trading partners are being systematically dismantled. Kim Jong-un no longer boasts that his people will not need to “tighten their belts,” as he pledged upon assuming power. North Korean news services complain that sanctions are hurting and anecdotal reports also suggest growing disillusionment with Kim’s economic stewardship.

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