Background: In December 2017, President Trump declared Jerusalem the capital of Israel and said the U.S. would open an embassy there, which occurred last May. But the embassy-consulate merger, first announced on Oct. 18 of last year by Secretary of State Pompeo, is far more than a cost-savings device or a means to improve past administrative operations. (Previously, the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv handled all matters relating to Gaza while the consulate in Jerusalem dealt with the West Bank and Jerusalem.)

Between the lines: The merger might create the impression that the administration envisions not a two-state solution, but what Israel's Netanyahu has called a "state-minus" Palestinian entity, with most of Jerusalem, save some potential adjustments, falling under Israeli sovereignty, along with much of the West Bank.

• Coming a month before Israeli elections, the merger will also strengthen the bond between Trump and Netanyahu and further the perception that the administration wants Netanyahu re-elected.

The other side: Palestinians will see the merger of the consulate — after the closing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization office in Washington — as a further effort to downgrade their status. It will only fuel the apprehension that the Trump administration has no policy toward Palestinians beyond pressure and that Washington has surrendered its role as an effective broker.

What to watch: The administration's most decisive litmus test for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will come after Israel's April 9 elections, when it plans to unveil its much-touted "ultimate deal" Middle East peace plan. The odds of success for such an unprecedentedly comprehensive peace plan are vanishingly small.

Aaron David Miller is vice president for new initiatives and director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center and a former Middle East analyst and negotiator at the State Department under Democratic and Republican administrations.

Indeed, the administration has long demonstrated a pattern of walking back — even disassociating — the U.S. from its past adherence to a two-state solution, and has sought to align its position more closely with the views of the Israeli Government and domestic constituencies. Beyond refugees and the right of return (which previous administrations steered clear of), two other tenets of the U.S. posture have been fundamentally recast:

1. Two-state solution: Trump has refused to endorse the idea, let alone base it on June 1967 lines, even with substantial territorial modifications. The administration’s use of the term “Palestinian state” has been grudging and qualified at best. Instead, the administration appears to favor some kind of Palestinian statelet, with Israel retaining large portions of the West Bank.
2. Jerusalem: Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and decision to open a U.S. embassy there was a major reframing of the traditional U.S. policy premised on Jerusalem as the undivided capital of two states, not one. In announcing this decision, the administration did also call for negotiation on the city’s borders and sovereignty. But there’s no indication that Washington, much less Israel, is prepared to support east Jerusalem hosting a real Palestinian capital, with Palestinian control over parts of the Old City and Palestinian neighborhoods.

The bottom line: Taken together, the administration’s recent actions reflect an intent to redefine the parameters of U.S. policy in a way that will virtually assure rejection by Palestinians and key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, thereby relieving pressure on Israel. This redefinition comes at a time when the chances of a serious two-state negotiation are already minuscule.

Yes, but: Perhaps that’s the point. After all, Kushner has often said that nothing has worked before. So with little hope of launching serious negotiations, why not shake things up? But whatever the administration believes such a shake-up will achieve, it’s hard to imagine that either peace or security for Israelis or Palestinians is among them.

Aaron David Miller is vice president for new initiatives and director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center and a former Middle East analyst and negotiator at the State Department.

The players:

• Netanyahu and Abbas: A deal will require committed leaders who are masters of their politics, not prisoners of their ideologies and constituencies. Abbas is too weak, unpopular and attached to inflexible negotiating positions, while Netanyahu has no intention of becoming the prime minister who divides Jerusalem and returns Israel to anything close to its June 1967 borders. Given the Hamas-Fatah split, the PLO cannot even claim that it controls all the guns of Palestine, let alone that it speaks for two million Gazans. Indeed, Hamas' orchestration of the March of Return and demonstrations in Gaza has further revealed that it’s on the front lines and Abbas is on the sidelines.
• Trump administration: Opening an embassy in Jerusalem — tacit validation that Israel controls the city's east and west alike — has undermined the administration’s ability to be an effective, let alone honest, broker. If its pro-Israeli approach to Jerusalem and other issues isn’t balanced out in the administration's larger plan, it will fail, further diminishing U.S. credibility.
• Arab states: Exhausted and fatigued by the Palestinian issue, key Arab states — most notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE — are more concerned by the threats from Iran and Sunnis jihadis and less inclined to fight for the Palestinian issue, much less press the U.S. for action. In fact, these states are moving closer to the Israelis, which has shifted pressure from the Palestinian issue.

The bottom line: For now, the Israeli-Palestinian arena will continue to see both confrontation and accommodation. Israelis, Palestinians and any would-be mediators are likely to remain caught between a two-state solution still too important to abandon and one that’s now just too hard to negotiate and implement.

Aaron David Miller is vice president for new initiatives and director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center and a former Middle East analyst and negotiator at the State Department.