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An informal conference between Afghan and Taliban negotiators in Doha this Saturday was postponed indefinitely after the Taliban rejected President Ashraf Ghani’s list of delegates, leaving intra-Afghan discussions further behind even as direct U.S.–Taliban security talks move forward.

Why it matters: Without progress among Afghans, the U.S. cannot achieve its core counterterrorism objectives.

Background: Ghani has been unhappy with the structure of peace efforts and tried to reassert his role through a fraught effort to build a representative team. Even after letting the delegation grow to a whopping 250 members, however, there were serious problems with its composition.

With a presidential election scheduled for September, both Ghani and his opponents are tempted to use the peace process for electoral gain. One of the most powerful opposition leaders, Atta Mohammad Noor, was excluded and rejected Ghani's group as ignoring “social balance and the presence of the jihad and resistance faction.”

Despite the justified concerns of Afghan women, there were only 50 women on the list.

Where it stands: The Taliban would agree to meet government officials only in a “personal capacity” — a time-honored way to avoid legitimizing adversaries in early talks. But Ghani was ostentatious in presenting the delegation as his own, and told them in a public meeting to represent “the wishes of the Afghan nation and government.”

The Taliban also erred in insisting on its own list of Afghans,  looking more like a government trying to put together a canned town hall.

Between the lines: Tactically, it would almost certainly have helped the Taliban to meet a large, divided, and ill-prepared delegation, rather than to reject the meeting. 

Not to mention that a party doesn’t get to pick its adversary’s representatives. Secretary Pompeo, for example, would probably have preferred that his team not meet with the “Taliban Five,” whom he had bitterly criticized, but in paying that price he made faster progress toward a peace framework. 

What to watch: In the short term, both sides may be feel an illusory short-term relief over the breakdown.

Ghani slowed a peace process he distrusts, but President Trump called the war in Afghanistan “ridiculous” early this month and may withdraw U.S. troops even without progress toward peace.

The Taliban are spared from revealing their internal divisions, but they cannot long avoid that if they want to see civil war averted and American forces withdrawn.

The bottom line: With patience, the U.S. could exert leverage to help avoid worst-case scenarios. But after 2 generations of war, a successful peace process in Afghanistan will be long, complex and halting.

Jarrett Blanc is a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was acting special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan under President Obama.

Latest Afghan-Taliban peace talks fall apart before they begin

After 2 generations of war, the peace process continues to be fraught.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. Photo: Afghan Presidency Press Office / Handout/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

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Afghanistan

Expert Voices

An informal conference between Afghan and Taliban negotiators in Doha this Saturday was <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="postponed indefinitely" data-vars-click-url="https://in.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-taliban/peace-talks-postponed-as-taliban-objects-to-size-of-afghan-delegation-idINKCN1RU0WB?il=0" data-vars-content-id="00225501-8b2b-4896-8853-30d5a62c0ac8" data-vars-headline="Latest Afghan-Taliban peace talks fall apart before they begin" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://in.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-taliban/peace-talks-postponed-as-taliban-objects-to-size-of-afghan-delegation-idINKCN1RU0WB?il=0" target="_blank">postponed indefinitely</a> after the Taliban rejected President Ashraf Ghani’s list of delegates, leaving intra-Afghan discussions further behind even as <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="direct U.S.–Taliban security talks" data-vars-click-url="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/07/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks.html" data-vars-content-id="00225501-8b2b-4896-8853-30d5a62c0ac8" data-vars-headline="Latest Afghan-Taliban peace talks fall apart before they begin" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/07/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks.html" target="_blank">direct U.S.–Taliban security talks</a> move forward.Why it matters: Without progress among Afghans, the U.S. cannot achieve its core counterterrorism objectives.

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin will appear before the chairs of seven House committees in a classified briefing Thursday afternoon on the administration’s decision to lift sanctions against Russian aluminum giant Rusal. The decision along with its accompanying deal would reduce oligarch Oleg Deripaska’s ownership stake and control of the company (Deripaska has been linked to Paul Manafort).

Why it matters: If Congress demands answers to the right questions, it could improve Russia sanctions policy, but Rusal makes for a poor target. The Treasury Department has repeatedly delayed implementing the sanctions in order to avoid a catastrophic break with European allies, whose high-end manufacturers depend on Rusal for aluminum and cannot easily find new suppliers.

Background: Deripaska and his companies were designated in April 2018 for secondary sanctions that would have imposed severe penalties on non–U.S. firms doing business with them.

European manufacturers — and automakers in particular — would be squeezed by tight supply in the aluminum market, especially since it can take up to a year to validate a new supplier. BMW cannot sell an $80,000 car without complete confidence in its aluminum quality.

The administration notified Congress of its plan just before the holiday recess and government shutdown, cutting into the legislature's 30-day window to review the deal and consider a “resolution of disapproval” that would leave sanctions in place.

Between the lines: Mnuchin's briefing marks a belated introduction to congressional oversight for Trump's Cabinet. Although the administration made a mess with Rusal sanctions, Congress should not respond by forcing sanctions that would hurt allies more than adversaries.

It's hard to know how much the sanctions would hurt Deripaska himself: He would lose access to some assets, but that's likely a small inconvenience considering his wealth.

Deripaska and his fellow oligarchs are not the real targets of the sanctions, and shifting ownership structures would not put any pressure on Putin and the Kremlin. If anything, wealthy Russians might be reminded of how dependent they are on the regime.

Ultimately, Rusal sanctions miss their target. The U.S. does not have much leverage when the collateral damage includes important European employers.

The bottom line: With the Treasury Department losing technical staff, tactical mistakes like this become more likely. Congress should pursue further oversight of sanctions that were poorly implemented in 2018 and insist on a strategic approach to high-priority objectives, especially to discourage meddling in the elections of the U.S and its allies.

Jarrett Blanc is a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Congress can improve sanctions policy, but Rusal is a poor target

High-end European manufacturers would become collateral damage.

Oleg Deripaska. Photo: Sergei Savostyanov/TASS via Getty Images

Economic sanctions

Politics

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin will appear before the chairs of seven House committees in a classified briefing Thursday afternoon on the administration’s decision to lift sanctions against Russian aluminum giant Rusal. The decision along with its accompanying deal would reduce oligarch Oleg Deripaska’s ownership stake and control of the company (Deripaska has been <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="linked to Paul Manafort" data-vars-click-url="https://www.axios.com/how-the-russia-probe-closed-in-on-paul-manafort-1513305650-1c200dd2-f97d-4475-83bc-1d0d602014a9.html" data-vars-content-id="0e5208bf-c029-454f-8125-f1b23e4cdbe9" data-vars-headline="Congress can improve sanctions policy, but Rusal is a poor target" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.axios.com/how-the-russia-probe-closed-in-on-paul-manafort-1513305650-1c200dd2-f97d-4475-83bc-1d0d602014a9.html" target="_self">linked to Paul Manafort</a>).Why it matters: If Congress demands answers to the right questions, it could improve Russia sanctions policy, but Rusal makes for a poor target. The Treasury Department has repeatedly delayed implementing the sanctions in order to avoid a catastrophic break with European allies, whose high-end manufacturers depend on Rusal for aluminum and cannot easily find new suppliers.

President Biden has made the COVID-19 crisis and a post-Trump return to national unity and traditional democratic ideals his top priorities. From vaccinations to stimulus to schools, Biden is seeking bipartisan compromise while showing a willingness to use executive authority and bare Democratic majorities in the U.S. House and Senate to implement his policies. Republican leaders are navigating deep party divisions over if and how to move beyond former President Trump.

Politics & Policy

The U.S. is ostentatiously promoting cooperation with India on ballistic missile defense, highlighting it in the 2019 Missile Defense Review as a “key element” of its Indo-Pacific strategy.

Why it matters: Pakistan is certain to see any such cooperation as a move against its nuclear force. Even though ballistic missile defense systems have nothing to do with the battlefield in Afghanistan, where the low-tech Taliban has forced the U.S. to the table, the move could threaten the U.S.-Taliban withdrawal negotiations by spurring Pakistan to reinforce its support for the group. 

Background: Pakistan has provided safe haven and other support to Taliban forces fighting in Afghanistan. Given India’s massive conventional military — not to mention economic and demographic — advantages, Pakistani national security thinking rests on “asymmetric” forces, including terrorist proxies and nuclear weapons. If Pakistan’s military leaders fear that their nuclear deterrent is at risk, they will reinforce their terrorist proxies. 

Between the lines: Pakistan’s aggressive approach to its security has left itself and its neighbors poorer and more violent. But that does not mean that Pakistan can be ignored.

While Pakistan’s control of the Taliban is often exaggerated by Afghan political elites seeking to minimize the civil nature of Afghanistan’s war, it can still provide safe haven and other support to dissatisfied Afghan groups, using them as proxies to undermine any peace deal if it thinks its interests — including the ongoing conflict with India — have not been taken into account.

What to watch: Navigating Afghan peace will require that the Trump administration not only stick to a clear message, but also prioritize the peace process when making decisions linked to the issue in complex, non-obvious ways. A deal with the Taliban that secures some important U.S. and Afghan interests remains possible, but not if the U.S. chooses unnecessary public confrontations with Pakistan on less urgent issues. 

Jarrett Blanc is a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

U.S.-India missile defense strategy could threaten Afghan peace process

Pakistan will see such cooperation as a move against its nuclear force.

Acting Pentagon chief Patrick Shanahan arrives in Kabul on February 11, 2019. 

Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan in Kabul, Feb. 11. Photo: Sylvie Lanteaume/AFP via Getty Images

Taliban

The U.S. is ostentatiously promoting <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="cooperation with India" data-vars-click-url="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-india-in-talks-over-missile-defence-collaboration-pentagon/story-Eeof2GwVqfYPviGVQt9nFM.html;%20" data-vars-content-id="5dbf7696-a2bd-4873-8a60-7445e92b8f37" data-vars-headline="U.S.-India missile defense strategy could threaten Afghan peace process" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-india-in-talks-over-missile-defence-collaboration-pentagon/story-Eeof2GwVqfYPviGVQt9nFM.html;%20" target="_blank">cooperation with India</a> on ballistic missile defense, highlighting it in the 2019 <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="Missile Defense Review" data-vars-click-url="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF" data-vars-content-id="5dbf7696-a2bd-4873-8a60-7445e92b8f37" data-vars-headline="U.S.-India missile defense strategy could threaten Afghan peace process" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF" target="_blank">Missile Defense Review</a> as a “key element” of its Indo-Pacific strategy.Why it matters: Pakistan is certain to see any such cooperation as a move against its nuclear force. Even though ballistic missile defense systems have nothing to do with the battlefield in Afghanistan, where the low-tech Taliban has forced the U.S. to the table, the move could threaten the <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="U.S.-Taliban withdrawal negotiations" data-vars-click-url="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/world/asia/usa-taliban-afghanistan-deal.html" data-vars-content-id="5dbf7696-a2bd-4873-8a60-7445e92b8f37" data-vars-headline="U.S.-India missile defense strategy could threaten Afghan peace process" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/world/asia/usa-taliban-afghanistan-deal.html" target="_blank">U.S.-Taliban withdrawal negotiations</a> by spurring Pakistan to reinforce its support for the group.

The designation of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) imposes few if any new restrictions. As President Trump noted, though, it is technically an "unprecedented" action, since the label was intended for non-state actors.

The big picture: This amounts to just one more layer of opprobrium on top of Iran’s 1984 designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, the IRGC’s designation under separate counterterrorism authorities, and a long list of related sanctions. Because most countries and firms worried about U.S. sanctions have already left the Iranian market, it's unlikely to chill much international business.

Where it stands: Iran has already announced that it will designate the U.S. military as a terrorist organization — a similarly symbolic gesture. It may end there. 

Yes, but: The real concern is that this designation will escalate the conflict between Washington and Tehran, in three possible ways.

Iran has so far failed to take the bait as U.S. sanctions have expanded. They probably hope to stay that course, but the IRGC designation could trigger a policy change or at least provide a pretext for factions in Tehran looking for confrontation.

Lower-level commanders and officials might take this rhetoric as instruction or permission for more aggressive action on the ground, leading to unintended escalations in Iraq, Syria, the Gulf or other places where both countries have military forces.

Ambassador John Bolton and other hardliners are clearly frustrated by Iran’s tempered reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear accord. By remaining compliant with the deal, Iran has spared U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere from having to to choose sides. But further provocations from the Trump administration would be harder for Tehran to ignore and could prompt a crisis.

Between the lines: U.S. partners forced by proximity to rub elbows with the IRGC — including the governments of Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon — might worry that unavoidable contacts could make them subject to U.S. sanctions, but enforcing any would require Washington to take further and ultimately self-defeating positions.

What to watch: It's possible the FTO designation is a sop to hardliners who failed to persuade the president to adopt a more aggressive posture. Or, as can't be ruled out in an administration that has not prioritized interagency policy review and decision-making, it could prove disconnected from other Iran policy decisions.

Risks of terrorist designation on Iran's Guard Corps outweigh rewards

Tensions between Washington and Tehran could escalate even further.

photo of Islamic Revolution Guards Corps commander, Major General Mohammad-Ali Jafari

Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, at a press conference in Tehran in 2012. Photo: Mohsen Shandiz/Corbis via Getty Images

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The designation of Iran&#x27;s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) imposes few if any new restrictions. As <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="President Trump noted" data-vars-click-url="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/" data-vars-content-id="b631c42a-a9f1-4e9b-8a92-f24d89b44f5a" data-vars-headline="Risks of terrorist designation on Iran&#x27;s Guard Corps outweigh rewards" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/" target="_blank">President Trump noted</a>, though, it is technically an &quot;unprecedented&quot; action, since the label was intended for non-state actors.The big picture: This amounts to just one more layer of opprobrium on top of Iran’s <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="1984 designation" data-vars-click-url="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm" data-vars-content-id="b631c42a-a9f1-4e9b-8a92-f24d89b44f5a" data-vars-headline="Risks of terrorist designation on Iran&#x27;s Guard Corps outweigh rewards" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm" target="_blank">1984 designation</a> as a state sponsor of terrorism, the <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="IRGC’s designation" data-vars-click-url="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0177.aspx" data-vars-content-id="b631c42a-a9f1-4e9b-8a92-f24d89b44f5a" data-vars-headline="Risks of terrorist designation on Iran&#x27;s Guard Corps outweigh rewards" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0177.aspx" target="_blank">IRGC’s designation</a> under separate counterterrorism authorities, and a long list of related sanctions. Because most countries and firms worried about U.S. sanctions <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="have already left" data-vars-click-url="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/04/trump-iran-revolutionary-guard-terrorist-organization/586663/" data-vars-content-id="b631c42a-a9f1-4e9b-8a92-f24d89b44f5a" data-vars-headline="Risks of terrorist designation on Iran&#x27;s Guard Corps outweigh rewards" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/04/trump-iran-revolutionary-guard-terrorist-organization/586663/" target="_blank">have already left</a> the Iranian market, it&#x27;s unlikely to chill much international business.

On Nov. 4, the U.S. will re-impose sanctions on Iran that had been lifted under the Iran nuclear deal. In response, the Bank of Kunlun, which handles China’s financial transactions with Iran, informed customers that on Nov. 1 it will stop processing them. China’s largest oil refiners, Sinopec and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), may also stop importing Iranian oil in November.

Why it matters: China is Iran’s largest oil importer and most important trading partner. Because China is better insulated from U.S. sanctions than other major importers, Iran could avoid the worst economic effects of U.S. sanctions if China continues buying its oil. But if China cuts back, Iran will likely pull out of the nuclear deal, leaving it free to resume an unrestricted nuclear program.

The background: Nevertheless, Chinese government officials have been deeply critical of President Trump’s nuclear deal withdrawal. At the UN Security Council's September meeting, Foreign Minister Wang stressed economic sovereignty and defended “the legitimate right of all countries to normal economic relations and trade with Iran.”

There are three ways to think about China’s latest moves:

A bargaining strategy. China is seeking discounts and other favorable commercial terms for continued trade with Iran, so leaking that its oil refiners are rethinking their positions gives China leverage. Since Trump is sensitive to oil prices, China may also be trying to soften the U.S. position by surprising the market and pushing prices up.

A way to restructure trade with Iran. China may simply be further insulating its biggest firms from Iran-related sanctions by removing them from this trading relationship, leaving smaller Chinese refiners and banks to step into the gaps left by Kunlun, Sinopac and CNPC. This would put some effective limits on Iranian oil sales and other trade without totally shutting it down.

A diplomatic concession. If China is preparing to comply with re-imposed U.S. sanctions, it might be as a sweetener to secure a Trump–Xi meeting at the November G20 to make progress on the trade war, which is vastly more important to both countries than Iran sanctions.  

The bottom line: In any case, the Trump administration has succeeded in creating the impression that China bowed to U.S. pressure, something China was careful to avoid when it substantially reduced Iranian oil purchases under President Obama. By acting before Trump’s November deadline and leaking waiver requests, China has made, in principle, an important concession.

With U.S. sanctions looming, China loosens trade ties with Iran

If China cuts oil imports, Iran will likely abandon the nuclear deal.

China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif walking

China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during the meeting of the UN General Assembly on Sept. 25. Photo: Alexander Shcherbak/TASS via Getty Images

China foreign policy

Business

China

On Nov. 4, the U.S. will re-impose sanctions on Iran that had been lifted under the Iran nuclear deal. In response, the Bank of Kunlun, which handles China’s financial transactions with Iran, informed customers that on Nov. 1 it <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="will stop processing them" data-vars-click-url="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-banking-kunlun-exclusive/exclusive-as-u-s-sanctions-loom-chinas-bank-of-kunlun-to-stop-receiving-iran-payments-sources-idUSKCN1MX1KA" data-vars-content-id="e53204ff-c27b-467f-862d-14ce624a2e87" data-vars-headline="With U.S. sanctions looming, China loosens trade ties with Iran" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-banking-kunlun-exclusive/exclusive-as-u-s-sanctions-loom-chinas-bank-of-kunlun-to-stop-receiving-iran-payments-sources-idUSKCN1MX1KA" target="_blank">will stop processing them</a>. China’s largest oil refiners, Sinopec and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="may also stop importing Iranian oil in November." data-vars-click-url="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-oil-exclusive/exclusive-sinopec-cnpc-to-skip-iran-oil-bookings-for-november-as-us-sanctions-near-idUSKCN1MY1C9" data-vars-content-id="e53204ff-c27b-467f-862d-14ce624a2e87" data-vars-headline="With U.S. sanctions looming, China loosens trade ties with Iran" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-oil-exclusive/exclusive-sinopec-cnpc-to-skip-iran-oil-bookings-for-november-as-us-sanctions-near-idUSKCN1MY1C9" target="_blank">may also stop importing Iranian oil in November.</a>Why it matters: China is Iran’s <a class="gtmContentClick" data-vars-link-text="largest oil importer" data-vars-click-url="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-oil-exclusive/exclusive-sinopec-cnpc-to-skip-iran-oil-bookings-for-november-as-us-sanctions-near-idUSKCN1MY1C9" data-vars-content-id="e53204ff-c27b-467f-862d-14ce624a2e87" data-vars-headline="With U.S. sanctions looming, China loosens trade ties with Iran" data-vars-event-category="story" data-vars-sub-category="story" data-vars-item="in_content_link" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-oil-exclusive/exclusive-sinopec-cnpc-to-skip-iran-oil-bookings-for-november-as-us-sanctions-near-idUSKCN1MY1C9" target="_blank">largest oil importer</a> and most important trading partner. Because China is better insulated from U.S. sanctions than other major importers, Iran could avoid the worst economic effects of U.S. sanctions if China continues buying its oil. But if China cuts back, Iran will likely pull out of the nuclear deal, leaving it free to resume an unrestricted nuclear program.

China is becoming the most formidable rival America has faced, and the risk of confrontation with Russia, North Korea or Iran still looms. Authoritarians are rising, the chaotic Afghanistan exit revealed the limits of U.S. power, and the pandemic, climate change and other critical challenges continue to pose grave threats.

Jarrett Blanc

Stories

Latest Afghan-Taliban peace talks fall apart before they begin

Risks of terrorist designation on Iran's Guard Corps outweigh rewards

U.S.-India missile defense strategy could threaten Afghan peace process

Congress can improve sanctions policy, but Rusal is a poor target

With U.S. sanctions looming, China loosens trade ties with Iran