European officials are sober about the SPV's potential. They acknowledge it will not seriously affect the scope of trade and commerce with Iran, as companies will not risk crushing financial penalties or trading access to the U.S. market for Iran’s far more modest one. That's why they are starting with humanitarian goods, in principle not subject to sanctions.

• Still, anything that cushions the blow of U.S. sanctions and demonstrates European resistance to the Trump administration's posture could help convince Iran's leadership that it's worth complying with the deal.

Reality check: If the SPV fails to produce any meaningful dividend to Iran, Tehran may sour on staying in a deal that imposes nuclear constraints without delivering economic benefits. Hardliners opposing the deal are already urging a response, including resuming some frozen nuclear activities. That could set off a dangerous chain reaction: European sanctions, more significant Iranian violations and possible military escalation.

• On the other hand, if the SPV somehow exceeds expectations, the U.S. might try to exert even more pressure on Europe to undermine it and scare off potential users, as the administration has warned.

The Iran deal's survival is a function of three clocks.

1. U.S. domestic politics: The Iranian regime is more likely to display patience if convinced Trump will prove a one-term president it can wait out.
2. Iranian domestic politics: As the country's own 2021 presidential elections approach, hardline calls for Tehran's withdrawal will grow louder.
3. European economic efforts: The harder the continent tries to effectively preserve some of the deal's economic benefits, the likelier Iran is to stick to it.

The bottom line: By establishing the SPV, the EU has put some time onto the third clock. But the others are still ticking, and the fate of the deal remains precarious.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

The administration had justified the U.S. presence in Syria with three objectives:

1. To roll back Iranian influence: From the outset, this aim was unattainable: Iran is deeply entrenched in Syria, and the suggestion that a few thousand U.S. troops could dislodge it was always derisory.
2. To fully defeat ISIS: This is a more achievable goal, though it arguably need not require U.S. troops on the ground, and an open-ended U.S. presence was neither wise nor sustainable. However, ISIS is adept at exploiting disorder, and if the U.S. withdrawal leads to a military free-for-all in the northeast (involving Kurdish, Syrian and Turkish forces), it could use the ensuing chaos to stage a comeback.
3. Protect Syrian Kurds from Ankara and Damascus: This is the most practically and morally important objective. Kurdish forces had fought ISIS at Washington’s behest and were relying on the U.S. presence to deter a potential Turkish or Syrian regime offensive. Indeed, Washington had discouraged them from reaching a deal with Damascus aimed at ensuring their protection, claiming there was no need.

Now, Kurdish forces will have to rush to negotiate an agreement with the regime from a far weaker bargaining position. Should the U.S. depart in the absence of a Kurdish understanding with either Damascus or Ankara, the Kurds could face an assault by one or both.

What’s next: If Trump does not once more reverse course, his and his administration’s priority should be to pressure Turkey not to attack, and to provide the Kurds with the necessary space and time to reach a deal with Damascus that restores Syrian sovereignty over the northeast, places Syrian forces at the Turkish border, and grants Kurds protection and a degree of self-rule.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

Details: The UAE, which has driven a military campaign that encircled the port and city, describes the Stockholm meeting as a “last chance” for the Houthis.

• If the UAE is not satisfied with the outcome, they threaten to dispatch Yemeni forces poised on the outskirts of Hodeidah to take the port, arguing that this would deprive the Houthis of a critical revenue stream and thus force them to compromise.
• This could happen as early as the coming holiday season, when the world is distracted.

To prevent this outcome, one of two things must happen: Either UN envoy Martin Griffiths negotiates a deal under which Hodeidah comes under UN control (something the Houthis have signaled openness to); or Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s Western allies pressure them not to launch the offensive.

• Despite calling for a cease-fire last month, however, the Trump administration has done nothing to achieve it and instead doubled down on its support for Saudi Arabia.

What to watch: In the wake of the Nov. 29 Senate vote to advance a resolution ending U.S. participation in the conflict — and with anger growing at Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war, its murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and Trump's complacent approach to both — it has become more likely that Congress will force the administration's hand, lest the U.S. be viewed as complicit in the impending famine.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group. Peter Salisbury is a senior analyst on Yemen with the group.