Context: Israel has carried out hundreds of airstrikes against Iranian and Iran-linked targets in Syria for years, motivated by concerns that Iran-backed forces could set up near the armistice line on the Golan Heights, and that Iran has been transferring high-precision weapons to its local allies, including Hezbollah.

What's happening: In an operation in Aqraba, Syria, last week, Israel destroyed what it called "killer drones" that it said Iran was going to use to attack.

• In Iraq — which is already caught between competing U.S. and Iranian interests — Israel is suspected of having conducted attacks targeting munitions storage facilities used by Iraqi paramilitary groups, including one last month.
• Then on Aug. 25, the Lebanese army claimed that an Israeli drone "crashed and [a] second drone exploded in the air" in Beirut. The next day, another suspected Israeli drone hit an Iran-backed militia in the Bekaa Valley.
• In a speech on Sunday, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah warned that a response to the incidents in Lebanon "may take place at any time on the borders and beyond the borders."
• On Monday, Iraq's political leadership met with senior militia commanders and, without naming names, denounced "blatant, hostile acts." An electoral bloc drawn from the paramilitary forces went further, calling the incidents "a declaration of war" carried out by Israel that the U.S. is "fully responsible" for as well.
• Israel has only officially acknowledged one set of operations in recent days: the "large-scale attack of multiple killer drones" via airstrikes in Syria.

Between the lines: Previous escalations between Iran and Israel in Syria have been contained. Israeli strikes have rarely elicited significant responses, and if they did, Israel retaliated with major military actions — like Operation House of Cards in May 2018, which swiftly ended that particular episode of escalation.

The bottom line: The current escalation is drawing in a far wider range of actors and is hitting closer to Iran’s core interests, making it that much more difficult to prevent, contain or control.

Robert Malley is president & CEO of the International Crisis Group. Naysan Rafati is Crisis Group's Iran analyst.

Where it stands: Breaching the 300 kilogram limit on low-enriched uranium earlier this month was a fairly modest, reversible first step; increasing enrichment levels beyond the 3.67% allowed under the deal begins to chip away at the deal's non-proliferation gains. But the move is still more of a warning sign than a meaningful step toward a bomb.

What to watch: There are 3 likely scenarios.

1. Fearful of a growing crisis, Europe seeks to mediate between Washington and Tehran. In a July 6 phone call with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani, French President Emmanuel Macron discussed the prospects of resuming nuclear talks. That would almost certainly require Iran's return to compliance with the deal and a U.S. commitment to some sanctions relief, though the latter seems unlikely.
2. Should that fail, Europe could condemn Iran's latest move while treating it as an act of diplomatic brinkmanship rather than a non-proliferation crisis. In turn, it could expedite work on financial channels to appease Iran and keep the agreement from fully unraveling.
3. Dissatisfied with European and the U.S. responses, Iran breaches more sensitive parts of the deal, such as enriching to 20% or limiting access by international nuclear inspectors. Europe could then initiate the JCPOA's dispute resolution mechanism for non-compliance, eventually leading to the reimposition of sanctions against Iran. The breaches also could trigger a U.S. or Israeli military operation against Iranian nuclear facilities.

The bottom line: The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA did not kill the deal, but new sanctions have made it difficult for anyone else to save the accord. As the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign continues, it leaves fewer and fewer off-ramps from potential confrontations.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, where Ali Vaez directs the Iran Project.

Where it stands: In the wake of his electoral victory, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin is likely to form a right-wing coalition, but it's too early to know how much influence the most extreme elements of his coalition will enjoy, whether he will abide by his last-minute pledge to annex West Bank settlements, or how long he can survive in the face of his likely indictment.

• On the U.S. side, the Trump administration could present its peace plan in June, or later, or not at all — with or without the political counterpart to the economic plan.

Between the lines: Those questions notwithstanding, the direction of Israel’s policies in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem has long been set: expanding settlement construction and increased entrenchment. The main issue left to be determined is how far and fast that process will go.

• The basic trajectory of U.S. policy is also set. Assuming it is presented, and even if it some of its elements go beyond what Netanyahu's more right-wing coalition allies can stomach, the Trump administration's plan will fall short of what even the most pragmatic Palestinians can accept. Netanyahu likely will greet it with a "yes, but," some Arab states with a "no, but," and Palestinians with a flat "no."
• What will remain are U.S. decisions to move its embassy to Jerusalem, cut off assistance to the Palestinians and recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

The bottom line. The Palestinian's national movement is at a generational, political and strategic crossroads. Most Palestinians by now have given up on a two-state solution, negotiations, the U.S., and their own leadership. Virtually everything about their future is up for grabs: continue on the current path or demand equal rights in a single state, resolve divisions between Fatah and Hamas or descend into internecine strife, opt for a nonviolent mass protest strategy or resort to violence.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.