Where it stands: In the wake of his electoral victory, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin is likely to form a right-wing coalition, but it's too early to know how much influence the most extreme elements of his coalition will enjoy, whether he will abide by his last-minute pledge to annex West Bank settlements, or how long he can survive in the face of his likely indictment.

• On the U.S. side, the Trump administration could present its peace plan in June, or later, or not at all — with or without the political counterpart to the economic plan.

Between the lines: Those questions notwithstanding, the direction of Israel’s policies in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem has long been set: expanding settlement construction and increased entrenchment. The main issue left to be determined is how far and fast that process will go.

• The basic trajectory of U.S. policy is also set. Assuming it is presented, and even if it some of its elements go beyond what Netanyahu's more right-wing coalition allies can stomach, the Trump administration's plan will fall short of what even the most pragmatic Palestinians can accept. Netanyahu likely will greet it with a "yes, but," some Arab states with a "no, but," and Palestinians with a flat "no."
• What will remain are U.S. decisions to move its embassy to Jerusalem, cut off assistance to the Palestinians and recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

The bottom line. The Palestinian's national movement is at a generational, political and strategic crossroads. Most Palestinians by now have given up on a two-state solution, negotiations, the U.S., and their own leadership. Virtually everything about their future is up for grabs: continue on the current path or demand equal rights in a single state, resolve divisions between Fatah and Hamas or descend into internecine strife, opt for a nonviolent mass protest strategy or resort to violence.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

Background: The Feb. 23 gambit was aimed at exposing Maduro as impotent (if he couldn’t prevent the entry of aid), oblivious to his people’s needs (if he tried to), or hanging by a thread (if the military balked at his orders to stop it). In that regard, it failed.

• While the government once again used force against civilians, further eroding its credibility, the opposition failed to achieve its goals: Humanitarian aid did not reach the people, and the small number of security force desertions highlighted the government’s resilience more than its frailty.
• The episode ended in a draw, but, given that Maduro was on the defensive, a draw was a government win.

What’s next: If Maduro refuses to step down and the anti-Maduro camp insists that he does, the crisis will endure.

• This won’t be optimal for the government, which could well stay in power but find it increasingly difficult to govern for lack of resources.
• But the pain will be felt chiefly by others: ordinary citizens who will suffer the devastating effects of a crumbling economy and oil sanctions, and Venezuela’s neighbors, who will face a growing influx of refugees.

Two unfavorable scenarios could result: steady aggravation of the country’s misery, with no plan for recovery; or renewed interest in a perilous foreign military intervention that could sow chaos in a country awash with weapons and armed groups.

The bottom line: To avoid either of these outcomes, third-party mediation will be required to appeal to more pragmatic forces among those sympathetic to former president Hugo Chávez and those on the opposition side. The optimal outcome would be an inclusive transitional government comprising Chavistas and the opposition, as well as the military, followed by free and fair elections under a neutral electoral body with international monitoring.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

European officials are sober about the SPV's potential. They acknowledge it will not seriously affect the scope of trade and commerce with Iran, as companies will not risk crushing financial penalties or trading access to the U.S. market for Iran’s far more modest one. That's why they are starting with humanitarian goods, in principle not subject to sanctions.

• Still, anything that cushions the blow of U.S. sanctions and demonstrates European resistance to the Trump administration's posture could help convince Iran's leadership that it's worth complying with the deal.

Reality check: If the SPV fails to produce any meaningful dividend to Iran, Tehran may sour on staying in a deal that imposes nuclear constraints without delivering economic benefits. Hardliners opposing the deal are already urging a response, including resuming some frozen nuclear activities. That could set off a dangerous chain reaction: European sanctions, more significant Iranian violations and possible military escalation.

• On the other hand, if the SPV somehow exceeds expectations, the U.S. might try to exert even more pressure on Europe to undermine it and scare off potential users, as the administration has warned.

The Iran deal's survival is a function of three clocks.

1. U.S. domestic politics: The Iranian regime is more likely to display patience if convinced Trump will prove a one-term president it can wait out.
2. Iranian domestic politics: As the country's own 2021 presidential elections approach, hardline calls for Tehran's withdrawal will grow louder.
3. European economic efforts: The harder the continent tries to effectively preserve some of the deal's economic benefits, the likelier Iran is to stick to it.

The bottom line: By establishing the SPV, the EU has put some time onto the third clock. But the others are still ticking, and the fate of the deal remains precarious.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.