Where it stands: Breaching the 300 kilogram limit on low-enriched uranium earlier this month was a fairly modest, reversible first step; increasing enrichment levels beyond the 3.67% allowed under the deal begins to chip away at the deal's non-proliferation gains. But the move is still more of a warning sign than a meaningful step toward a bomb.

What to watch: There are 3 likely scenarios.

1. Fearful of a growing crisis, Europe seeks to mediate between Washington and Tehran. In a July 6 phone call with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani, French President Emmanuel Macron discussed the prospects of resuming nuclear talks. That would almost certainly require Iran's return to compliance with the deal and a U.S. commitment to some sanctions relief, though the latter seems unlikely.
2. Should that fail, Europe could condemn Iran's latest move while treating it as an act of diplomatic brinkmanship rather than a non-proliferation crisis. In turn, it could expedite work on financial channels to appease Iran and keep the agreement from fully unraveling.
3. Dissatisfied with European and the U.S. responses, Iran breaches more sensitive parts of the deal, such as enriching to 20% or limiting access by international nuclear inspectors. Europe could then initiate the JCPOA's dispute resolution mechanism for non-compliance, eventually leading to the reimposition of sanctions against Iran. The breaches also could trigger a U.S. or Israeli military operation against Iranian nuclear facilities.

The bottom line: The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA did not kill the deal, but new sanctions have made it difficult for anyone else to save the accord. As the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign continues, it leaves fewer and fewer off-ramps from potential confrontations.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, where Ali Vaez directs the Iran Project.

Where it stands: In the wake of his electoral victory, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin is likely to form a right-wing coalition, but it's too early to know how much influence the most extreme elements of his coalition will enjoy, whether he will abide by his last-minute pledge to annex West Bank settlements, or how long he can survive in the face of his likely indictment.

• On the U.S. side, the Trump administration could present its peace plan in June, or later, or not at all — with or without the political counterpart to the economic plan.

Between the lines: Those questions notwithstanding, the direction of Israel’s policies in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem has long been set: expanding settlement construction and increased entrenchment. The main issue left to be determined is how far and fast that process will go.

• The basic trajectory of U.S. policy is also set. Assuming it is presented, and even if it some of its elements go beyond what Netanyahu's more right-wing coalition allies can stomach, the Trump administration's plan will fall short of what even the most pragmatic Palestinians can accept. Netanyahu likely will greet it with a "yes, but," some Arab states with a "no, but," and Palestinians with a flat "no."
• What will remain are U.S. decisions to move its embassy to Jerusalem, cut off assistance to the Palestinians and recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.

The bottom line. The Palestinian's national movement is at a generational, political and strategic crossroads. Most Palestinians by now have given up on a two-state solution, negotiations, the U.S., and their own leadership. Virtually everything about their future is up for grabs: continue on the current path or demand equal rights in a single state, resolve divisions between Fatah and Hamas or descend into internecine strife, opt for a nonviolent mass protest strategy or resort to violence.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

Background: The Feb. 23 gambit was aimed at exposing Maduro as impotent (if he couldn’t prevent the entry of aid), oblivious to his people’s needs (if he tried to), or hanging by a thread (if the military balked at his orders to stop it). In that regard, it failed.

• While the government once again used force against civilians, further eroding its credibility, the opposition failed to achieve its goals: Humanitarian aid did not reach the people, and the small number of security force desertions highlighted the government’s resilience more than its frailty.
• The episode ended in a draw, but, given that Maduro was on the defensive, a draw was a government win.

What’s next: If Maduro refuses to step down and the anti-Maduro camp insists that he does, the crisis will endure.

• This won’t be optimal for the government, which could well stay in power but find it increasingly difficult to govern for lack of resources.
• But the pain will be felt chiefly by others: ordinary citizens who will suffer the devastating effects of a crumbling economy and oil sanctions, and Venezuela’s neighbors, who will face a growing influx of refugees.

Two unfavorable scenarios could result: steady aggravation of the country’s misery, with no plan for recovery; or renewed interest in a perilous foreign military intervention that could sow chaos in a country awash with weapons and armed groups.

The bottom line: To avoid either of these outcomes, third-party mediation will be required to appeal to more pragmatic forces among those sympathetic to former president Hugo Chávez and those on the opposition side. The optimal outcome would be an inclusive transitional government comprising Chavistas and the opposition, as well as the military, followed by free and fair elections under a neutral electoral body with international monitoring.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.