Members of Congress have increasingly become convinced that Khashoggi was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on high-level orders. This is true not merely for Democrats, and not merely for known Saudi critics. Senator Lindsey Graham, for example, voiced his unqualified condemnation, along with Senators Bob Corker, Marco Rubio and others. This crowd will only expand if the House changes hands next month. The crown prince is about to find out whether his investment in Trump will protect him from potential Congressional action, such as blocking arms sales or defunding support for Saudi-Emirati operations in Yemen.

On the Saudi side, internal debates are far less public and media reports of dissent within the royal family far less substantiated. Still, MBS’ remarkable ascent, coupled with his rash decisions on Yemen, Lebanon and Qatar, has undoubtedly rankled some, and the fallout from Khashoggi’s murder validates their concerns.

Reality check: U.S. and Saudi internal dynamics are closely intertwined: If the Trump approach prevails, and U.S.–Saudi relations revert to quasi-normalcy, dissenting Saudi voices likely will remain quiet; if Congress acts, the domestic Saudi case against a crown prince who mismanaged the country’s most important bilateral relationship will strengthen.

The bottom line: It would be foolhardy to bet against the Trump–MBS duo getting its way: While a penchant for fabrication on Trump's part and for intimidation on MBS' has gotten both men into trouble, it's also what put them in power. But Trump’s rush to look past Khashoggi’s murder paradoxically has made any cover-up harder for other Americans to swallow or the administration to pull off — as evidenced by Treasury Secretary Mnuchin’s last-minute decision not to attend a financial conference in Riyadh. The foundation of the bilateral relationship has doubtless gotten shakier.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

Commentators have speculated that King Salman’s position sounds the death knell for the U.S. initiative, but that might be a premature burial. Although Saudi Arabia is counseling Washington to wait for a more favorable regional context (a weaker Iran, more time elapsed since the highly unpopular decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem) before unveiling its ideas, the administration might not feel it needs Saudi public acceptance.

More likely, the U.S. will go forward with its plan — even in the face of absolute rejection by the Palestinian leadership, which it has given up on — if the administration can bank on a “yes, but” from Israel (Prime Minister Netanyahu will express reservations about any plan that makes allowances for Palestinian statehood) and a “no, but” from key Arab countries (which will disapprove of parts of the plan, but could nonetheless support engagement with the U.S.).

The bottom line: The U.S. sees an opportunity in Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s needs for American support against Iran, and believes it can shift the conversation on Israel–Palestine from final-status issues toward the prospect of a more prosperous (if likely fanciful) economic future. That approach would fulfill Trump’s desire for a deal, but it won’t generate Arab backing. Nor will it move the Israeli–Palestinian conflict any closer to resolution, likely turning the Palestinian people even more strongly against the U.S., the peace process and even the two-state solution.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.

Who wants what:

• Jordan hoped for a gradual, nonviolent return of regime control in the southwest, if only to prevent another refugee influx. It had been banking on the U.S. and Russia to accede, but American resistance created an impasse.
• Israel insists that Iranian forces stay away from its borders. If the Assad regime advances with only Russian support, Israel likely will acquiesce; if there's an Iranian presence, however, it could hit back. Russia will attempt deconfliction between the two.
• Russia would have preferred a deal with the U.S. to enable an uncontested regime return, but is happy playing its usual game: claiming it is not wedded to Assad but displaying no willingness to divorce.
• The U.S. has been hobbled by disputes between those who want to focus on the Islamic State and were prepared for a deal with Russia; those fixated on Iran and inclined to help the opposition to resist a regime they see as Tehran’s extension; those focused on countering Iran but unconcerned about a southwest likely to fall regardless; and then Trump himself, intent mainly on getting the roughly 2,000 U.S. troops out of Syria. The end result has been a hands-off approach: neither acceding to, nor opposing, the regime advance.

The bottom line: Syria was always going to be part of the Trump–Putin conversation. But if Putin gets to the planned Helsinki summit with the southwest in regime hands, there will be little left to negotiate. Russia wants the U.S. out of Syria but so does Trump, so it’s not clear what Putin might trade for something Trump's eager to do anyway. Trump also wants Iran out of Syria, but that’s not something Russia can deliver. The end result could well be a statement that speaks loftily of a complete foreign-force withdrawal and the noble goal of a political solution, followed by few if any changes on the ground.

Robert Malley is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.