The lapsing waivers, following the U.S. designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, expand the administration's approach of unilateral coercion against Iran.

Where it stands: In anticipation of the announcement, world oil prices hit their highest level since November, when the U.S. re-imposed sanctions on Iran following withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

• With Libya in chaos and Venezuelan exports depressed by sanctions and deteriorating infrastructure, it will be difficult for consumers of heavy crude to find adequate substitutes despite the administration's claims that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and U.S. production will increase to fill the gaps.

The impact: Pompeo claimed the U.S. is acting in the interests of the Iranian people, but they will pay the biggest price as Iran's hard currency earnings dwindle and their government shores up support among its conservative base.

What to watch: Whether Iran's main remaining customers — China, Turkey and India — will bow to U.S. demands remains uncertain. China has denounced the secondary sanctions as illegal; Turkey is a major importer of Iranian energy, as is India, which is in the throes of parliamentary elections.

• Enforcement will also present challenges for the U.S. Transactions between Iran and its major trading partners already avoid the U.S. dollar, and new mechanisms such as Europe's INSTEX are being developed to reduce the dollar's dominance in international transactions.
• Overuse of sanctions, without a clear and realistic goal, could simply encourage more such efforts and ultimately reduce the utility of sanctions as a tool of international diplomacy.

The bottom line: Long accustomed to sanctions and to changing U.S. policies, Iran will likely hunker down and ride out the Trump administration and its threats.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The big picture: To Washington's frustration, both Iran and the rest of the world have stuck with the deal nearly a year after the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally. Even as its oil exports have more than halved since the U.S. restored sanctions in November, Iran has remained compliant with the deal's restrictions on its nuclear program.

Background: When it withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, the Trump administration said the intention was to bring the Islamic Republic back to the negotiation table. U.S. officials said they sought a more comprehensive agreement that would cover Iran's regional interventions, ballistic missile program and imprisonment of dual nationals.

• But the underlying motivation appeared to be a hope that Iran would also quit the JCPOA, making it easier to convince the rest of the world to abandon it.

What's new: European countries, far from quitting, have come up with a payment mechanism intended to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran at a time when Western banks are too terrified of U.S. sanctions to attempt even authorized business with Tehran.

• Vice President Mike Pence inveighed against the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle, warning in Warsaw that it "will only strengthen Iran, weaken the EU and create still more distance between Europe and America."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the Warsaw conference was intended to create a coalition for "war" against Iran — a comment that was later softened to "confrontation."

• Yes, but: This pressure does not have broad international support. Although Israel and Iran's Arab rivals attended the gathering, Russia, China, Turkey and most European foreign ministers declined.

Where it stands: Iran is facing a bleak immediate future, with its economy expected to shrink 6% in 2019, on the back of falling oil exports, high inflation and unemployment. Even still, Iranians are not raring for another revolution, as Secretary Mike Pompeo has continued to suggest. They keenly recall how the last one turned out, and how chaotic a process regime change has been for their neighbors Afghanistan and Iraq.

The bottom line: Current U.S. policy will neither bring Iran back to the negotiating table nor kill the JCPOA.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Details: Pompeo directed heavy rhetorical fire at Iran. In contrast to President Obama — who in a major 2009 address in Cairo expressed his desire for a new relationship with Tehran, despite a history of mutual grievances — Pompeo promised “to confront the ayatollahs, not coddle them” and to combat “the full array of the regime’s malign activities.”

• He defended the Trump administration’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and said that the 12 demands he outlined for Iran to become a “normal nation” in his first major speech as secretary last May are still U.S. policy.

Unlike his predecessor in the George W. Bush administration, Condoleezza Rice, who chided U.S. partners for jailing dissidents, Pompeo made no mention of Saudi Arabia's brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi or its continued incarceration of peaceful advocates of reform.

Pompeo also called on Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to “unleash the creative energy of Egypt’s people,” but praised his “courage” in “promoting religious freedom” — even as some 60,000 political prisoners languish in Egyptians jails, five years after Sisi took power in a coup.

The bottom line: To the extent that the Trump administration has a strategy for the Middle East, it appears light on military presence and heavy on rhetoric and economic sanctions. Echoing Obama, Pompeo called this a “new beginning,” but whether it will be any more successful than his predecessors' initiatives remains to be seen.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.