The big picture: To Washington's frustration, both Iran and the rest of the world have stuck with the deal nearly a year after the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally. Even as its oil exports have more than halved since the U.S. restored sanctions in November, Iran has remained compliant with the deal's restrictions on its nuclear program.

Background: When it withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, the Trump administration said the intention was to bring the Islamic Republic back to the negotiation table. U.S. officials said they sought a more comprehensive agreement that would cover Iran's regional interventions, ballistic missile program and imprisonment of dual nationals.

• But the underlying motivation appeared to be a hope that Iran would also quit the JCPOA, making it easier to convince the rest of the world to abandon it.

What's new: European countries, far from quitting, have come up with a payment mechanism intended to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran at a time when Western banks are too terrified of U.S. sanctions to attempt even authorized business with Tehran.

• Vice President Mike Pence inveighed against the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle, warning in Warsaw that it "will only strengthen Iran, weaken the EU and create still more distance between Europe and America."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the Warsaw conference was intended to create a coalition for "war" against Iran — a comment that was later softened to "confrontation."

• Yes, but: This pressure does not have broad international support. Although Israel and Iran's Arab rivals attended the gathering, Russia, China, Turkey and most European foreign ministers declined.

Where it stands: Iran is facing a bleak immediate future, with its economy expected to shrink 6% in 2019, on the back of falling oil exports, high inflation and unemployment. Even still, Iranians are not raring for another revolution, as Secretary Mike Pompeo has continued to suggest. They keenly recall how the last one turned out, and how chaotic a process regime change has been for their neighbors Afghanistan and Iraq.

The bottom line: Current U.S. policy will neither bring Iran back to the negotiating table nor kill the JCPOA.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Details: Pompeo directed heavy rhetorical fire at Iran. In contrast to President Obama — who in a major 2009 address in Cairo expressed his desire for a new relationship with Tehran, despite a history of mutual grievances — Pompeo promised “to confront the ayatollahs, not coddle them” and to combat “the full array of the regime’s malign activities.”

• He defended the Trump administration’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal and said that the 12 demands he outlined for Iran to become a “normal nation” in his first major speech as secretary last May are still U.S. policy.

Unlike his predecessor in the George W. Bush administration, Condoleezza Rice, who chided U.S. partners for jailing dissidents, Pompeo made no mention of Saudi Arabia's brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi or its continued incarceration of peaceful advocates of reform.

Pompeo also called on Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to “unleash the creative energy of Egypt’s people,” but praised his “courage” in “promoting religious freedom” — even as some 60,000 political prisoners languish in Egyptians jails, five years after Sisi took power in a coup.

The bottom line: To the extent that the Trump administration has a strategy for the Middle East, it appears light on military presence and heavy on rhetoric and economic sanctions. Echoing Obama, Pompeo called this a “new beginning,” but whether it will be any more successful than his predecessors' initiatives remains to be seen.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Where it stands:

• The administration has granted India a waiver to continue to import about 1.25 million tons of oil a month from now until March.
• South Korea, Turkey and Iraq have sought and are expected to receive similar exemptions.
• China bought a huge quantity of Iranian oil — 20 million barrels — in October, to tide it over for several months.

Between the lines: The more successful the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign is against Iran, the higher oil and gasoline prices will rise, hurting U.S. consumers and potentially sparking a global recession. The administration also risks further antagonizing U.S. allies that remain committed to the Iran nuclear deal and want to keep Iran compliant.

More stringent punishments will also incentivize the EU and others to find ways to work around the U.S. financial system. While the efficacy of such mechanisms remains to be seen, they provide an important political and psychological boost for the Iranian government.

Iran, meanwhile, is already employing techniques used during prior periods of heavy sanctions to continue selling oil and reaping the profits. These include turning off the tracking devices on Iranian oil tankers and transferring oil to other ships on the high seas. Iran is also expected to commingle its oil with Russian crude to circumvent sanctions.

The bottom line: Trump's sanctions against Iran will be less successful than those imposed in 2012, when the Obama administration had near universal international support and the sanctions were backed by both the UN Security Council and the EU. Iran will try to wait out the Trump presidency in hopes that a successor will return to the 2015 nuclear deal or seek new negotiations based on more realistic premises.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.