Background: The Trump administration delivered the first major blow to the JCPOA when it withdrew unilaterally in May 2018; the coup de grace came this April with the announcement that it would permit no more Iranian oil exports.

• Iran initially tried to exert strategic patience and wait out the administration. But it began signaling in April that it could not remain in compliance without receiving the economic benefits promised in return for verifiable curbs on its nuclear program.
• The Iranian public has paid a steep price, watching the economy tank as the government takes greater risks to amass leverage.

What's next: After recent incidents in the Persian Gulf, the Iranians appear to have calculated that the Trump administration is too risk-averse to resort to military action and potentially touch off a regional conflagration.

• President Trump has made it clear he does not want another war in the Middle East, however prepared some of his advisers may be for escalation.
• Yet the U.S. remains isolated on Iranian issues. Despite evidence that Iran was behind attacks on two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman last week and earlier incidents, many U.S. allies distrust the Trump administration and worry that accepting its conclusion could be seen as justifying a military response. (The U.K. and Saudi Arabia concur with the U.S. assessment.)

The bottom line: Longer-term nuclear restrictions will likely require the U.S. to negotiate a new agreement that provides more durable sanctions relief. In the meantime, tensions could keep rising, pushing up oil prices and further straining an already dysfunctional Middle East.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The lapsing waivers, following the U.S. designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, expand the administration's approach of unilateral coercion against Iran.

Where it stands: In anticipation of the announcement, world oil prices hit their highest level since November, when the U.S. re-imposed sanctions on Iran following withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

• With Libya in chaos and Venezuelan exports depressed by sanctions and deteriorating infrastructure, it will be difficult for consumers of heavy crude to find adequate substitutes despite the administration's claims that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and U.S. production will increase to fill the gaps.

The impact: Pompeo claimed the U.S. is acting in the interests of the Iranian people, but they will pay the biggest price as Iran's hard currency earnings dwindle and their government shores up support among its conservative base.

What to watch: Whether Iran's main remaining customers — China, Turkey and India — will bow to U.S. demands remains uncertain. China has denounced the secondary sanctions as illegal; Turkey is a major importer of Iranian energy, as is India, which is in the throes of parliamentary elections.

• Enforcement will also present challenges for the U.S. Transactions between Iran and its major trading partners already avoid the U.S. dollar, and new mechanisms such as Europe's INSTEX are being developed to reduce the dollar's dominance in international transactions.
• Overuse of sanctions, without a clear and realistic goal, could simply encourage more such efforts and ultimately reduce the utility of sanctions as a tool of international diplomacy.

The bottom line: Long accustomed to sanctions and to changing U.S. policies, Iran will likely hunker down and ride out the Trump administration and its threats.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The big picture: To Washington's frustration, both Iran and the rest of the world have stuck with the deal nearly a year after the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally. Even as its oil exports have more than halved since the U.S. restored sanctions in November, Iran has remained compliant with the deal's restrictions on its nuclear program.

Background: When it withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, the Trump administration said the intention was to bring the Islamic Republic back to the negotiation table. U.S. officials said they sought a more comprehensive agreement that would cover Iran's regional interventions, ballistic missile program and imprisonment of dual nationals.

• But the underlying motivation appeared to be a hope that Iran would also quit the JCPOA, making it easier to convince the rest of the world to abandon it.

What's new: European countries, far from quitting, have come up with a payment mechanism intended to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran at a time when Western banks are too terrified of U.S. sanctions to attempt even authorized business with Tehran.

• Vice President Mike Pence inveighed against the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle, warning in Warsaw that it "will only strengthen Iran, weaken the EU and create still more distance between Europe and America."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the Warsaw conference was intended to create a coalition for "war" against Iran — a comment that was later softened to "confrontation."

• Yes, but: This pressure does not have broad international support. Although Israel and Iran's Arab rivals attended the gathering, Russia, China, Turkey and most European foreign ministers declined.

Where it stands: Iran is facing a bleak immediate future, with its economy expected to shrink 6% in 2019, on the back of falling oil exports, high inflation and unemployment. Even still, Iranians are not raring for another revolution, as Secretary Mike Pompeo has continued to suggest. They keenly recall how the last one turned out, and how chaotic a process regime change has been for their neighbors Afghanistan and Iraq.

The bottom line: Current U.S. policy will neither bring Iran back to the negotiating table nor kill the JCPOA.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.