In a background briefing for reporters on Monday, a senior Trump administration official boasted that, because of sanctions, the Iranian currency "is tanking, unemployment in Iran is rising, and there are widespread protests over social issues and labor unrest." At the same time, the administration refused to take responsibility for the humanitarian damage its policies have caused, placing the blame on Iran’s government.

Officials also continued to claim that the U.S. is leading a “coalition” against the Islamic Republic, even as European allies were decrying U.S. actions and vowing to maintain the deal despite U.S. sabotage.

The main beneficiary of the U.S.' Iran reversal is China, which became Iran's top trading partner more than a decade ago. Beijing has already told the Trump administration that it will not reduce Iranian oil imports after the slated return of oil sanctions on November 4. Turkey, India, Russia and some small and medium-sized European companies have also said they will continue to trade with Iran.

The bottom line: President Trump, who has offered to meet with Iran’s leaders, seems to think he can produce a better deal than the one that hundreds of diplomats and scientists from seven countries worked for years to accomplish. But Iran is unlikely to bow to U.S. demands and is not interested in a photo-op summit. Iranians will suffer, but the U.S. is unlikely to benefit.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The details: In his most Reaganesque comment, Pompeo said that "the U.S. hears you, the U.S. supports you and the U.S. is with you" when it comes to the Iranian people’s aspirations for greater freedom and prosperity, as evidenced by recent protests in Iran. He claimed that the U.S. goal was for Iranians in Iran to achieve "the same quality of life Iranians in America enjoy."

Yes, but: Pompeo neglected to mention that a major cause of Iranians’ current economic plight is the Trump administration’s decision to unilaterally quit the 2015 Iran nuclear deal after months of undermining its implementation. The "maximum pressure" campaign the administration is seeking to impose, Pompeo claimed, is directed at Iranian leaders. But ordinary Iranians have suffered most from the collapse of their currency triggered by the U.S. decision. He also downplayed concerns about the travel ban, recently upheld by the Supreme Court, which makes it extremely difficult for Iranians to travel to the U.S. to see family or attend university.

Some Iranian American organizations such as the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) boycotted the speech, accusing Pompeo of seeking to co-opt legitimate Iranian grievances. A NIAC–sponsored ad in the Los Angeles Times that was signed by a number of prominent Iranian Americans stressed that "change must come from inside of Iran — not from Washington or anywhere else."

Iranian American organizations that sent representatives to the speech said they were doing so not to endorse the Trump administration’s policies but to use the opportunity to suggest improvements. The Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA) sent this analyst a statement prior to the speech stating that Pompeo’s remarks "presented an opportunity for PAAIA members to directly inform the administration about the near unanimous opposition Iranian Americans have towards the travel ban as well as the importance of enhancing sanctions relief on telecommunication tools, food, and medicine for the Iranian people."

The bottom line: Pompeo’s protestations of concern for the Iranian people fall flat at a time when the U.S. is an outlier on the Iran nuclear deal, other countries are resisting the re-imposition of sanctions and the Trump administration shows scant concern for equal if not more serious human rights abuses by other countries with which it has chosen to engage diplomatically — among them Russia and North Korea.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The Trump administration has declared that it wants Iran’s oil customers to “go to zero” by November 4. But in reality, the administration will have to provide waivers for certain countries to avoid dire consequences.

“The more successful you are at [hurting Iran], the more complications you have at home with higher oil prices, and the more complications you have with your allies, pushing them into recession,” said Amos Hochstein, a former special envoy for International Energy Affairs who played a key role in imposing oil sanctions on Iran in 2012, at an Atlantic Center panel discussion.

There is sufficient spare capacity in the oil market to keep prices around the current $70 per barrel even if roughly a million of Iran’s daily exported barrels are taken off the market. But in the longer term, after about six months, that strategy becomes increasingly risky, especially in the absence of a clear understanding of the administration’s goals.

“The expiration date [for the sanctions] is very important,” said Sara Vakhshouri, the founder and president of SVB Energy International and a former adviser to Iran’s national oil company. “Using 70 percent of the world’s spare capacity might be doable in the short term, but what will happen in the event of a crisis?”

What's next: The administration doesn’t know at this point whether there will be waivers for U.S. allies. If the administration fails to dissuade foreign buyers from purchasing Iranian oil, his policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran will fail.

Barbara Slavin directs the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

Go deeper: Atlantic Council experts discuss "Oil and Iran: How Renewed Sanctions Will Affect Iran and World Markets"