Context: The Sochi meetings come amid a series of events that send mixed messages about U.S. intentions.

• On May 3, President Trump had a 90-minute call with Putin, ostensibly to discuss the their countries' standoff over the situation in Venezuela, where Russia has doubled down on Nicolás Maduro and the U.S. has recognized Juan Guaidó. Contrary to previous statements by Pompeo, Trump told reporters afterward that Russia "is not looking at all to get involved in Venezuela."
• On May 7, Pompeo canceled a planned meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel just hours before he was due to arrive in Berlin. Shortly after, the U.S. announced Pompeo's visit to Russia — sending a cold message to European allies at a time when the transatlantic relationship is already fragile.
• Pompeo's visit this week may also include planning for a Trump-Putin meeting during the G20 summit in Japan on June 28, where the administration would seek to avoid a repeat of the Helsinki Summit.

Between the lines: It would not be unusual for the U.S. secretary of state to meet with his Russian counterpart ahead of a major summit or to pursue negotiations on a specific issue. But Putin's attendance may signal an attempt to leverage the recent call with Trump — after which Trump took the Kremlin's line on Venezuela — to get concessions on U.S. support for Guaidó.

• Meanwhile, it's doubtful Pompeo will get Russia to scale back support for Iran, which is likely the Trump administration’s top priority.

The bottom line: Given each party's contradictory aims, the best outcome of the Sochi meeting may be no outcome at all.

Alina Polyakova is the David M. Rubenstein Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Flashback: This follows a Russian attack last fall on Ukrainian vessels in the Kerch Strait, in which Russia arrested 24 Ukrainian sailors it continues to hold in custody. In March, the U.S., EU, Canada and Australia imposed additional sanctions on Russia for that attack.

Context: Russia has also used "passportization" in Georgia and Crimea. The tactic aims to make the long-term resolution of the conflict and return of contested territories more difficult.

• In the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Russia is contravening the Minsk accords — a ceasefire it signed in 2015 with Ukraine, Germany, France and representatives of the so-called People's Republics.
• The EU and the U.S. have linked sanctions to the Minsk process and the U.S. has dispatched Ambassador Kurt Volker as a special envoy, but those efforts have not ended the impasse or compelled Moscow to fulfill its obligations.

Where it stands: The U.S. and EU have criticized Putin's decree but have not committed to decisive action, such as further sanctions.

• The EU said that the Kremlin's decision demonstrates the "intention to further destabilize Ukraine and to exacerbate the conflict."
• In a statement, the U.S. State Department condemned the decision as "highly provocative" and a "serious obstacle to the implementation of the Minsk agreements."
• The UN Security Council met to discuss the issue on Thursday.

The bottom line: If Russia's latest move against Ukraine goes unpunished, Moscow is likely to see it as carte blanche for further aggressive acts before Ukraine's new government is in place this fall. Western leaders should have learned by now that these destabilizing tactics don't stop in Ukraine, they are part of Russia's larger efforts to undermine democracies around the world.

Alina Polyakova is the David M. Rubenstein Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Background: Moscow has been harassing commercial ships bound for Ukraine’s ports in the Sea of Azov for months, even though Russia and Ukraine have dual control of the sea according to a 2003 agreement. At least 150 merchant vessels have been detained since May, creating significant losses for Ukrainian ports and shipping companies.

Moscow has at least four possible motivations to escalate the conflict now:

1. Putin’s approval ratings have slipped 16 points, from 82% in April to 66% in October. In the past, the Kremlin has used foreign interventions to shore up nationalist support for Putin and secure a bump in ratings, as with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and to a lesser extent its 2015 military intervention in Syria.
2. In May, Russia opened a bridge over the Kerch Strait, connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea and further securing its claim to the peninsula. Moscow now seems keen to occupy the sea as well.
3. Should Russia’s Kerch Strait blockade continue, it would add pressure on Ukraine’s struggling economy. Two major Ukrainian ports — Mariupol and Berdyansk — rely on access through the strait for commercial shipments, which has already been partially restricted by the the Kerch bridge’s height.
4. Moscow may also have an opportunity to pressure President Poroshenko ahead of Ukraine's presidential elections, since he is deeply unpopular and polling in the single digits.

The bottom line: The conflict in the Sea of Azov is unlikely to lead to a massive military engagement or World War III. But the Kremlin seems confident that it will not pay a high price for low-level military aggression similar to its activities in Ukraine’s east. If the international response is weak, Moscow may see an opening for yet more assertive military strikes in the future.

Alina Polyakova is the David M. Rubenstein Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.