Khalilzad is a known neoconservative figure in the U.S. war in Afghanistan, which has entered its eighteenth year. He previously served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq and later as the UN ambassador during the George W. Bush administration. As an Afghan-American, Khalilzad has a unique understanding of Afghanistan that President Bush tried to capitalize on when Hamid Karzai was sworn in as Afghanistan’s president in 2004.

Yes, but: His strong connection with Karzai and the visibility of his extended family’s involvement in the Afghan government, which included seeking contracts, raised some concerns within American diplomatic circles about his conflicting interests. In 2008, there was a rumor that Khalilzad might even run as a presidential candidate in Afghanistan’s elections.

The central question is, what happens if Khalilzad is unable to deliver? He has often advocated for creating avenues of mutual understanding between the Afghan government and the Taliban. But he has also been very critical of Pakistan’s sponsorship of the group, even as the Trump administration has asked Pakistan to facilitate talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

The bottom line: There's no way to know whether Khalizad will be successful, but it’s safe to say that the Afghan peace process just got trickier.

Sahar Khan is an adjunct scholar in the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department.

The Taliban are militarily strong and have continued to challenge the Afghan government in recent months, as evidenced by the attacks in Farah, Ghazni, and Kunduz. But as the war in Afghanistan enters its 18th year, a consensus has emerged among all stakeholders — the U.S., the Afghan government, Afghanistan’s neighboring countries and the Taliban themselves — that the ongoing war in Afghanistan can’t end without a political solution. For example, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Alice Wells met with Taliban officials in Qatar last month to restart peace talks, and continues to urge Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to negotiate.

The Taliban of course can simply reject the ceasefire and continue attacks on Afghan security forces. But in accepting Ghani’s offer, the group would show a serious interest in a political solution. It would also distinguish itself from other violent militant groups operating in Afghanistan, such as ISIS, which launched rockets on Kabul residents celebrating Eid on Tuesday.

The bottom line: A second ceasefire right now is in every major stakeholder's interest — even the Taliban’s. And while it would in all likelihood be insufficient to create legitimate and lasting avenues for political reconciliation, it is an essential step toward peace in Afghanistan.

Sahar Khan is a visiting research fellow in the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department.

The details:

• Ikramullah Gandapur of the Pakistan Tehreel-i-Insaf party was killed on Sunday in a suicide attack orchestrated by the Pakistani Taliban.
• The Pakistani Taliban also claimed responsibility for the attack on July 10 in Peshawar that claimed Haroon Bilour, a candidate of the Awami National Party, along with 20 others at a campaign event.
• On July 13, the Pakistani Taliban attacked Akram Khan Durrani’s convoy in North Waziristan, killing 4 people and injuring 32.
• That same day, the Islamic State took responsibility for a larger and bloodier attack in Mastung, Balochistan, killing over 130 people, including Nawabzada Siraj Raisani of the Balochistan Awami Party.

Candidates from the Pakistan Muslim League–N party have accused the military establishment of targeting the party and working to divide its vote base. The media has also accused the military of meddling to influence the national narrative — and ultimately the election results.

#HerVote, a campaign to encourage women to vote, has been trending online. But women in rural areas remain fearful of voting, and a ban on women voting continues in some locations.

The bottom line: The military’s interference in the elections not only hurts its credibility but also that of Pakistan’s political system. At the end of the day, the ability to vote safely doesn't much matter if the elections are unfair and unfree to begin with.

Sahar Khan is a visiting research fellow in the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department.