Modi has certainly adopted a hardline approach toward Pakistan, with the BJP often threatening to go to war. Also under Modi’s administration, India has been experiencing a rise in right-wing Hindu nationalism, which is not surprising in light of Modi’s roots in Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a Hindu-nationalist paramilitary organization accused of inciting sectarian violence and fueled by a religious ideology that advocates for Hinduism's dominance within India. The RSS sees Pakistan, a Muslim-majority neighbor, as the ultimate enemy.

Yes, but: Going to war with Pakistan would not guarantee an electoral victory for Modi, because there's no evidence that launching surgical strikes within Pakistan would deter militant groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba — responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks — from attacking Indian forces in Kashmir.

Rather, surgical strikes would lead to a conventional war that would destabilize the region, potentially creating a devastating nuclear conflict or a refugee crisis in a region already experiencing its fair share (the Afghan crisis after the Soviet invasion, for example, and the ongoing Rohingya crisis).

The congressional opposition, for its part, has criticized Modi and the BJP for politicizing the standoff with Pakistan for its own political gains during this election season.

The bottom line: Modi's re-election prospects would not be improved by his initiating a war. But unless Pakistan re-evaluates its use of militant proxies, and unless India ceases committing gross human rights atrocities in Kashmir, the two countries may stumble into one regardless.

Sahar Khan is an adjunct scholar in the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department.

Khalilzad is a known neoconservative figure in the U.S. war in Afghanistan, which has entered its eighteenth year. He previously served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq and later as the UN ambassador during the George W. Bush administration. As an Afghan-American, Khalilzad has a unique understanding of Afghanistan that President Bush tried to capitalize on when Hamid Karzai was sworn in as Afghanistan’s president in 2004.

Yes, but: His strong connection with Karzai and the visibility of his extended family’s involvement in the Afghan government, which included seeking contracts, raised some concerns within American diplomatic circles about his conflicting interests. In 2008, there was a rumor that Khalilzad might even run as a presidential candidate in Afghanistan’s elections.

The central question is, what happens if Khalilzad is unable to deliver? He has often advocated for creating avenues of mutual understanding between the Afghan government and the Taliban. But he has also been very critical of Pakistan’s sponsorship of the group, even as the Trump administration has asked Pakistan to facilitate talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

The bottom line: There's no way to know whether Khalizad will be successful, but it’s safe to say that the Afghan peace process just got trickier.

Sahar Khan is an adjunct scholar in the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department.

The Taliban are militarily strong and have continued to challenge the Afghan government in recent months, as evidenced by the attacks in Farah, Ghazni, and Kunduz. But as the war in Afghanistan enters its 18th year, a consensus has emerged among all stakeholders — the U.S., the Afghan government, Afghanistan’s neighboring countries and the Taliban themselves — that the ongoing war in Afghanistan can’t end without a political solution. For example, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Alice Wells met with Taliban officials in Qatar last month to restart peace talks, and continues to urge Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to negotiate.

The Taliban of course can simply reject the ceasefire and continue attacks on Afghan security forces. But in accepting Ghani’s offer, the group would show a serious interest in a political solution. It would also distinguish itself from other violent militant groups operating in Afghanistan, such as ISIS, which launched rockets on Kabul residents celebrating Eid on Tuesday.

The bottom line: A second ceasefire right now is in every major stakeholder's interest — even the Taliban’s. And while it would in all likelihood be insufficient to create legitimate and lasting avenues for political reconciliation, it is an essential step toward peace in Afghanistan.

Sahar Khan is a visiting research fellow in the Cato Institute's Defense and Foreign Policy Department.