What's happening: Chinese projects have sparked allegations, investigations and convictions around the world.

• The Malaysian government seized Chinese funds earlier this week, arguing that Chinese contractors took 80% of the funding for 2 pipeline projects after completing only 13% of the work.
• In Ecuador, a dam financed and built by China was at the center of several convictions, including that of a former vice president of Ecuador who was caught on tape discussing Chinese bribes.
• Chinese employees of the state-owned China Road and Bridge Corp. were arrested in Kenya after trying to bribe officials investigating a ticketing scam.
• In Kyrgyzstan, following the failure of a Chinese power plant, an investigation revealed the contractor had been inflating costs, buying $1,600 fire extinguishers and $320 pliers.

Where it stands: China is eager to repair the Belt and Road brand and has promised to clean things up.

• In April, at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, Xi declared, "In pursuing Belt and Road cooperation, everything should be done in a transparent way, and we should have zero tolerance for corruption."

Yes, but: The Chinese government does not want to get rid of all corruption, only unsanctioned corruption.

• It wants to assert more control over its state-owned enterprises, which often have more influence than Chinese ministries, while preserving the flexibility to buy friends and pursue its own aims with less scrutiny.

What's needed: There are more effective ways China could reduce BRI corruption:

• Make the program more transparent by releasing financing terms and contracts.
• Enforce the foreign bribery laws it has already adopted.
• Increase funding for anti-corruption training programs offered by independent international organizations.
• Block Chinese companies that have been debarred by multilateral development banks for fraud and corruption from receiving BRI–related contracts.

The bottom line: The BRI is opaque by design, and it is unlikely to become more transparent until China faces higher financial and reputational costs or stronger demands from its partners.

Jonathan Hillman is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Details: The study focuses on the BRI's transportation projects, forecasting that they could lift 7.6 million people from extreme poverty (earnings below $1.90 a day) if successfully completed.

• The world needs more infrastructure, especially developing countries in Asia, and it stands to benefit from anyone who provides it the right way.

Yes, but: Building infrastructure does not automatically create value, the study warns. Success depends on picking the right projects and delivering them effectively, otherwise they destroy more value than they create.

• While Chinese officials sell the BRI as “win-win,” some partner countries, like Mongolia and Tajikistan, could lose out as the costs of infrastructure exceed the gains. They also face particularly high risks of default from BRI–related financing.
• About half of BRI transportation projects are expected to provide little value, according to another recent World Bank study.

Where it stands: China likes the BRI just the way it is.

• Part of the problem is that its state-owned enterprises are eager to build regardless of economic viability; having poured more concrete between 2011 and 2013 than the United States used during the entire 20th century, they have run out of things to build at home.
• In the absence of transparency and effective oversight, these firms can bribe local officials in recipient countries to greenlight more and bigger projects.

Between the lines: China also faces a massive coordination challenge. Unlike efforts led by multilateral development banks, most of the BRI’s transportation corridors are defined only at the national level and do not name or prioritize individual cities and roadways. Without adequately defined scopes, these projects could squander resources.

The bottom line: The potential benefits the World Bank lays out are not unique to Chinese transportation projects. But China’s current approach to delivering infrastructure makes it less likely those benefits will materialize.

Jonathan Hillman is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Context: Submarine cables carry the vast majority of international data, from cloud computing to text messaging, and will only become more critical with the arrival of 5G.

• China aims to capture 60% of the world’s fiber-optic communications market, and it is not getting out of the underseas cable business, which is far too important, commercially and strategically.

Between the lines: Huawei’s move puts the spotlight on Hengtong Optic-Electric, a subsidiary of Hengtong Group whose ties with the Chinese military could draw just as much scrutiny.

• Like Huawei, Hengtong's founder served in the People’s Liberation Army.
• The PLA also gave the company an innovation award in 2015 and formed an academic partnership to research underseas cables the following year.
• The Chinese government has praised Hengtong as a model of “civil-military integration” for developing military-grade cable technology, underscoring the dual-use history of its technologies.

The impact: The sale would barely put a dent in Huawei’s portfolio. Last year, its underseas cable business generated $17 million in net profit, according to Huawei’s annual report — a drop in the bucket of its $8.6 billion in net profit.

What to watch: U.S. officials have been concerned that Huawei’s growing involvement in underseas cables could allow China to monitor or disrupt data traffic, per a Wall Street Journal report in March. Rather than limiting the fallout, Huawei’s sale might simply spread the damage by putting Hengtong in U.S. crosshairs.

Jonathan Hillman is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.