Where it stands: The underseas cable market is changing with the entrance of new players.

• A decade ago, Chinese companies were involved with just a handful of cables, almost exclusively in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
• Now China wants to dominate the global market. Huawei is building or improving nearly 100 submarine cables around the world.
• At the same time, Amazon, Facebook, Google, and other leading content providers are investing in their own underseas cable projects.

Between the lines: China’s digital silk road is where two of Xi Jinping’s signature policies meet:

1. Made in China 2025 is aggressively growing high-tech industries with state subsidies and ambitious targets, including capturing 60% of the global market for fiber optic communications.
2. The Belt and Road Initiative is an avenue for Chinese firms to expand into foreign markets and reach these targets, backed by a promised trillion dollars of infrastructure spending.

Flashback: History cautions that today’s commercial activities carry strategic stakes as well. In World War I, Britain was best positioned to maintain global communications among its forces and to monitor and disrupt enemy messages thanks to its network of cables.

The bottom line: So far, U.S. actions are focused on limiting Huawei’s access to Western markets. But to shape tomorrow’s communications networks, it would also have to compete in developing and emerging markets — especially in Asia and Africa, where 90% of global population growth by 2050 is expected.

Jonathan Hillman is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Where it stands: China's partners and outside observers have raised concerns around the BRI's strategic aims, as well as about corruption, debt sustainability, environmental impacts and local benefits.

• A draft communique includes new language that underscores the importance of manageable debt loads and "green development."
• Chinese officials are considering steps to improve project selection and assert greater control of the BRI, including adopting criteria for BRI projects. There has been no definition for what qualifies as a BRI project, allowing interest groups within and outside China to attach their agendas to the BRI.
• Beijing also wants to attract more partners to finance BRI projects, helping it share the burden for backing projects as well as the reputational hit when things go wrong.

Yes, but: Real changes will involve difficult costs, mostly for China.

• Ensuring that projects deliver more local benefits — by hiring more local workers, for example — means hiring fewer Chinese workers.
• Bringing in outside partners could mean less control over project specifics.
• Increasing transparency will make it harder to favor certain firms and funnel money to friends in high places.

The bottom line: China's promises for a revamped BRI will require further monitoring and scrutiny. While recent statements from Chinese officials are encouraging, better outcomes will require not just symbolic documents and politically expedient promises but also greater transparency and stricter enforcement.

Go deeper: Read the CSIS Global Infrastructure Task Force's BRI report, "The Higher Road."

Jonathan Hillman is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Between the lines: More than anyone, it is Beijing that wins out as countries compete for its attention, mainly in the form of bilateral deals.

• Roughly 70% of China's announced European deals are in non-EU countries — where environmental and procurement standards are lower and corruption is higher — even though they make up only 6% of the group’s collective GDP, according to CSIS data.
• Debt risks are rising. Montenegro, a member of NATO but not the EU, has seen its ratio of debt to GDP skyrocket from 63% in 2012 to nearly 80% in 2018. To make matters worse, it signed a highway deal that is worth over 25% of its GDP — in a contract that allows China to take Montenegrin land as collateral and requires any disputes to be settled in Chinese courts.
• Greece’s entrance into the group could fuel speculation about cooperation on new multi-country projects, especially links between Greece’s Port of Piraeus, majority-owned and operated by China's COSCO Shipping, and destinations farther inland.

What to watch: Later this month, China’s Belt and Road Forum is expected to attract representatives from over 100 countries and 40 heads of state. But what these celebrations conceal is that activity along the Belt and Road, including in Central and Eastern Europe, has declined. As China pushes to expand participation, but has less to dole out, the gap between expectations and reality along the BRI is likely to grow.

Jonathan Hillman is director of the Reconnecting Asia Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.