Rather than joining forces with Canada to preserve key parts of the agreement, Mexico appears to have conceded to all three of Trump’s main demands, including increasing North American–manufactured content requirements in the auto industry, introducing a sunset provision to potentially end the agreement every six years (after the first 10), and diluting trinational dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Although Mexican negotiators see this as a breakthrough, by eschewing trilateral talks they limited their bargaining power and ultimately left money on the table. The proposed rules will negatively affect Mexico's auto-manufacturing industry by mandating that 40% to 45% of auto content be made by workers making at least $16 per hour, while the sunset mechanism will shorten investors' time horizons to about 16 years.

A U.S.–Mexico trade agreement without Canada would face an uphill battle in Congress, not to mention legal challenges to the president’s authority to undo NAFTA. It would also be a far cry from the fully revamped agreement that Trump had promised.

The bottom line: Regardless, the announcement gives Trump the ability to tout the fulfillment of a major campaign promise ahead of the November midterm elections: the extraction of important concessions from Mexico.  

Gustavo Flores-Macías is an associate professor of government at Cornell University.

What's in store for the country after Maduro’s re-election:

1. With generalized irregularities before and on election day, Venezuela will remain a competitive authoritarian regime — one where elections are held but the results are predetermined.
2. The economic emergency will likely grow more dire, fueling a vicious cycle. The government corruption and mismanagement that contributed to hyperinflation, soaring violent crime, widespread poverty and the unprecedented exodus of Venezuelans will get worse as conditions deteriorate.
3. Although the recent increase in oil prices has eased some of the financial strain on government coffers, the disarray of Venezuela’s oil industry will prevent higher prices from translating into a palpable improvement in living conditions. With a
   37% production decline since 2015, the government’s inability to preserve its main source of hard currency suggests a slow but steady collapse of the state.

The big picture: As in 2005, boycotting elections has accomplished little for the opposition. To challenge Maduro in the future, the opposition will have to rally behind a common candidate, as in 2013, when Henrique Capriles lost to Maduro by only 1.5% of the vote.

Gustavo Flores-Macías is an associate professor of government at Cornell University.

Castro is slated to remain in control of the two main sources of power on the island, the Communist Party and the armed forces, until 2021. But this interim period could give Díaz-Canel an opening to grow comfortable in the presidency and find more room to maneuver as Castro approaches 90.

The bottom line: Cuba is beset by major challenges, including crumbling infrastructure, low productivity and a two-currency system. If the pragmatic new president can improve the lives of Cubans, he might garner the legitimacy needed to institute meaningful reforms, such as allowing private enterprise beyond the restaurant and tourist industries, lowering the tax burden on the fledgling private sector and letting market considerations drive a single currency.

Gustavo Flores-Macías is an associate professor of government at Cornell University.